Corporate Governance
Intermediate
Shareholder Activism
Efforts by shareholders to influence corporate strategy, governance, capital allocation, board composition, or transactions without necessarily acquiring full control.
Why It Matters
Activism raises recurring questions about monitoring, short-termism, institutional-investor incentives, voting rules, disclosure, and the market for corporate control.
Selected Literature
A short list of directly relevant archive entries.
2004
Advanced
Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard University Press
2007
Advanced
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
University of Pennsylvania Law Review
2009
Advanced
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell
Review of Financial Studies
2013
Advanced
The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights
Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon
Columbia Law Review
Related Cases
1988
Corporate Law
Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.
564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988)
Board action taken for the primary purpose of interfering with shareholder voting power.