Corporate Law and Corporate Governance
Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
- Year
- 2004
- Venue
- Harvard University Press
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Challenges the view that executive compensation is set through arm's-length bargaining between boards and managers. The book argues that managerial influence over pay arrangements can weaken the link between compensation and performance and can generate governance costs for shareholders.
Citation
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried. "Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation." Harvard University Press, 2004.
BibTeX
@book{Bebchuk2004Pay,
title = {Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation},
author = {Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried},
year = {2004},
publisher = {Harvard University Press},
url = {https://hls.harvard.edu/bibliography/pay-without-performance-the-unfulfilled-promise-of-executive-compensation/}
}