Corporate Law and Corporate Governance
The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights
Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon
- Year
- 2013
- Venue
- Columbia Law Review
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Analyzes governance under institutional shareholding and dispersed beneficial ownership. The article explains how activist investors can supply monitoring and information that diversified institutional investors may not produce themselves, while also raising questions about incentives, time horizons, and governance-right valuation.
Citation
Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon. "The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights." Columbia Law Review, 2013.
BibTeX
@article{Gilson2013The,
title = {The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights},
author = {Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon},
year = {2013},
journal = {Columbia Law Review},
url = {https://columbialawreview.org/content/the-agency-costs-of-agency-capitalism-activist-investors-and-the-revaluation-of-governance-rights/}
}