Corporate Law and Corporate Governance
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock
- Year
- 2007
- Venue
- University of Pennsylvania Law Review
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Analyzes hedge funds as active monitors and participants in corporate control contests. The article explains why hedge funds differ from traditional institutional investors and how their incentives affect voting, activism, mergers, and governance outcomes.
Citation
Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock. "Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control." University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2007.
BibTeX
@article{Kahan2007Hedge,
title = {Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control},
author = {Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock},
year = {2007},
journal = {University of Pennsylvania Law Review},
url = {https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol155/iss5/1/}
}