Foundations of Law and Economics
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules
Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner
- Year
- 1989
- Venue
- Yale Law Journal
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Distinguishes majoritarian defaults from penalty defaults that encourage better-informed parties to reveal information. The article turns the choice of background contract rules into a problem of strategic information design.
Citation
Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner. "Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules." Yale Law Journal, 1989.
BibTeX
@article{Ayres1989Filling,
title = {Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules},
author = {Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner},
year = {1989},
journal = {Yale Law Journal},
url = {https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/20.500.13051/781/2/Filling_Gaps_in_Incomplete_Contracts___An_Economic_Theory_of_Default_Rules.pdf}
}