Foundations of Law and Economics
Advanced
Nudge Design
The design of defaults, reminders, framing, timing, and simplification to influence decisions without eliminating available options.
Why It Matters
Nudge design provides a neutral framework for testing how small institutional changes affect savings, disclosure comprehension, consumer choice, voting, and administrative compliance.
Reading the Measure
A working relation and an interpretive limit for corporate-finance use.
Interpretive caution
A nudge should not be assumed effective or welfare-improving. Evaluation should identify the objective, comparison condition, heterogeneous effects, opt-out costs, and the evidence supporting the intervention.
Selected Literature
A short list of directly relevant archive entries.
1998
Advanced
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard H. Thaler
Stanford Law Review
2000
Advanced
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics
Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen
California Law Review
2004
Advanced
Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving
Richard H. Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi
Journal of Political Economy
Related Cases
1707
Foundations of Law and Economics
Keeble v. Hickeringill
11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707)
Property protection, malicious interference, and incentives to make productive use of land.
1805
Foundations of Law and Economics
Pierson v. Post
3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
First possession, capture rules, and the administrability of property rights in wild animals.
1854
Foundations of Law and Economics
Hadley v. Baxendale
9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)
Foreseeability, information disclosure, and limits on consequential damages for breach of contract.
1879
Foundations of Law and Economics
Sturges v. Bridgman
11 Ch. D. 852 (1879)
Nuisance, coming to the nuisance, and reciprocal conflicts over incompatible land uses.
