Foundations of Law and Economics
Intermediate
Choice Architecture
The institutional design of the environment in which choices are presented, including defaults, order, framing, timing, salience, and complexity.
Why It Matters
Choice architecture matters because legal systems often structure decisions without banning options, especially in disclosure, consumer finance, corporate voting, savings, and administrative processes.
Selected Literature
A short list of directly relevant archive entries.
1998
Advanced
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard H. Thaler
Stanford Law Review
2003
Advanced
2004
Advanced
Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving
Richard H. Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi
Journal of Political Economy
2012
Advanced
Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets
Oren Bar-Gill
Oxford University Press
Related Cases
1707
Foundations of Law and Economics
Keeble v. Hickeringill
11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707)
Property protection, malicious interference, and incentives to make productive use of land.
1805
Foundations of Law and Economics
Pierson v. Post
3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
First possession, capture rules, and the administrability of property rights in wild animals.
1854
Foundations of Law and Economics
Hadley v. Baxendale
9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)
Foreseeability, information disclosure, and limits on consequential damages for breach of contract.
1879
Foundations of Law and Economics
Sturges v. Bridgman
11 Ch. D. 852 (1879)
Nuisance, coming to the nuisance, and reciprocal conflicts over incompatible land uses.