Securities Regulation

Behavioral Economics and the SEC

Stephen J. Choi and A. C. Pritchard

Year
2003
Venue
Stanford Law Review
Level
Advanced
Stanford Law Review cover
Archive-designed coverStanford Law Review

Summary

Examines how behavioral biases among retail and institutional investors complicate securities regulation. The article uses behavioral law and economics to assess disclosure, antifraud enforcement, investor education, cooling-off rules, and regulatory interventions that assume investors can process information rationally.

Citation

Stephen J. Choi and A. C. Pritchard. "Behavioral Economics and the SEC." Stanford Law Review, 2003.

BibTeX

@article{Choi2003Behavioral,
  title = {Behavioral Economics and the SEC},
  author = {Stephen J. Choi and A. C. Pritchard},
  year = {2003},
  journal = {Stanford Law Review},
  url = {https://repository.law.umich.edu/facarticles/1576/}
}
Original source: University of Michigan Law Repository

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