Foundations of Law and Economics
Introductory
Behavioral Law and Economics
An approach to legal analysis that uses evidence about bounded rationality, bounded willpower, social preferences, heuristics, and biases to study how people actually respond to legal rules.
Why It Matters
It modifies standard incentive analysis by asking when legal actors, firms, investors, consumers, judges, and regulators deviate from rational-actor assumptions in systematic ways.
Selected Literature
A short list of directly relevant archive entries.
1979
Advanced
1991
Advanced
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler
Journal of Economic Perspectives
1998
Advanced
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard H. Thaler
Stanford Law Review
2000
Advanced
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics
Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen
California Law Review
Related Cases
1707
Foundations of Law and Economics
Keeble v. Hickeringill
11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707)
Property protection, malicious interference, and incentives to make productive use of land.
1805
Foundations of Law and Economics
Pierson v. Post
3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
First possession, capture rules, and the administrability of property rights in wild animals.
1854
Foundations of Law and Economics
Hadley v. Baxendale
9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)
Foreseeability, information disclosure, and limits on consequential damages for breach of contract.
1879
Foundations of Law and Economics
Sturges v. Bridgman
11 Ch. D. 852 (1879)
Nuisance, coming to the nuisance, and reciprocal conflicts over incompatible land uses.