Securities Regulation
Intermediate
Information Overload
A condition in which legally required information becomes too voluminous, complex, or poorly organized for investors or intermediaries to process effectively.
Why It Matters
Information overload challenges the simple assumption that more disclosure is always better and links securities regulation to behavioral economics, disclosure design, and investor comprehension.
Selected Literature
A short list of directly relevant archive entries.
1984
Intermediate
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel
Virginia Law Review
1984
Intermediate
Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System
John C. Coffee Jr.
Virginia Law Review
2003
Advanced
2016
Advanced
The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research
Christian Leuz and Peter D. Wysocki
Journal of Accounting Research
Related Cases
1943
Securities Regulation
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.
320 U.S. 344 (1943)
Whether sales of oil-lease assignments promoted together with a promised test well were investment contracts subject to federal securities law.
1946
Securities Regulation
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.
328 U.S. 293 (1946)
Definition of an investment contract under the federal securities laws.
1953
Securities Regulation
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.
346 U.S. 119 (1953)
Whether an issuer's unregistered stock offers to employees qualified as transactions not involving a public offering.
1963
Securities Regulation
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.
375 U.S. 180 (1963)
Whether an investment adviser's undisclosed practice of trading before and after its recommendations could be enjoined under the Investment Advisers Act.