Public Enforcement
Intermediate
Optimal Deterrence
The calibration of sanctions and enforcement probability so that actors internalize the expected social costs of wrongful conduct without excessive enforcement or overdeterrence.
Why It Matters
Optimal deterrence links criminal law, securities enforcement, financial regulation, corporate compliance, and tort law through the design of expected sanctions.
Selected Literature
A short list of directly relevant archive entries.
1968
Intermediate
2000
Intermediate
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Journal of Economic Literature
2004
Advanced
2019
Advanced
Related Cases
1980
Securities Regulation
Aaron v. SEC
446 U.S. 680 (1980)
Which antifraud provisions require the SEC to prove scienter when it seeks an injunction.
1994
Securities Regulation
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver
511 U.S. 164 (1994)
Private aiding-and-abetting liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
2013
Securities Regulation
Gabelli v. SEC
568 U.S. 442 (2013)
When the five-year limitations period begins for an SEC action seeking civil penalties for alleged fraud.
2019
Securities Regulation
Lorenzo v. SEC
587 U.S. 71 (2019)
Primary scheme liability for knowingly disseminating false statements authored by another person.