Securities Regulation
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
- Year
- 2000
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Literature
- Level
- Intermediate
Summary
Surveys the economic theory of public enforcement by public agents such as inspectors, auditors, police, and prosecutors. The article analyzes detection probability, sanction magnitude and form, liability rules, enforcement errors, settlement, self-reporting, repeat offenders, marginal deterrence, and principal-agent problems in enforcement.
Citation
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law." Journal of Economic Literature, 2000.
DOI: 10.1257/jel.38.1.45
BibTeX
@article{Polinsky2000The,
title = {The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law},
author = {A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell},
year = {2000},
journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
doi = {10.1257/jel.38.1.45},
url = {https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jel.38.1.45}
}