Public Enforcement
Intermediate
Marginal Deterrence
The design of sanctions so that more harmful violations face higher expected penalties than less harmful violations, preserving incentives to avoid additional social harm.
Why It Matters
Marginal deterrence matters when actors can choose among violations of different severity, as in financial misconduct, repeat offenses, disclosure violations, or escalating forms of legal noncompliance.
Selected Literature
A short list of directly relevant archive entries.
1968
Intermediate
2000
Intermediate
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
Journal of Economic Literature
2004
Advanced
2019
Advanced
Related Cases
1980
Securities Regulation
Aaron v. SEC
446 U.S. 680 (1980)
Which antifraud provisions require the SEC to prove scienter when it seeks an injunction.
1994
Securities Regulation
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver
511 U.S. 164 (1994)
Private aiding-and-abetting liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
2013
Securities Regulation
Gabelli v. SEC
568 U.S. 442 (2013)
When the five-year limitations period begins for an SEC action seeking civil penalties for alleged fraud.
2019
Securities Regulation
Lorenzo v. SEC
587 U.S. 71 (2019)
Primary scheme liability for knowingly disseminating false statements authored by another person.