
Hart
Oliver Hart
Economist of contract theory, firm boundaries, and corporate governance
Official Source Note
Harvard Law School identifies Hart as Lewis P. and Linda L. Geyser University Professor and notes his 2016 Nobel Prize. His profile describes his research as centered on ownership structure, contractual arrangements, governance, and firm boundaries.
Hart is included because incomplete-contract theory and residual control rights are central to corporate-law analysis of ownership, authority, and investment incentives.
Source: Harvard Law School
Relevance to the Archive
Hart gives corporate-law readers a precise way to connect ownership, residual control rights, investment incentives, and the allocation of authority inside firms.
Representative Contributions
- Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995)
- The Costs and Benefits of Ownership (with Sanford Grossman)
- Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (with John Moore)
Works Included Here
1980
Advanced
Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart
Bell Journal of Economics
1986
Advanced
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart
Journal of Political Economy
1990
Advanced
1995
Advanced
