Securities Regulation
Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart
- Year
- 1980
- Venue
- Bell Journal of Economics
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Develops the free-rider problem in takeover bids and explains why dispersed shareholders may not tender even when a takeover would improve firm value. The paper is central for understanding tender-offer rules, control premiums, defensive tactics, and the market for corporate control.
Citation
Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation." Bell Journal of Economics, 1980.
BibTeX
@article{Grossman1980Takeover,
title = {Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation},
author = {Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart},
year = {1980},
journal = {Bell Journal of Economics},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/3003400}
}