Corporate Law and Corporate Governance

The New Look of Deal Protection

Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian

Year
2017
Venue
Stanford Law Review
Level
Advanced
Stanford Law Review cover
Archive-designed coverStanford Law Review

Summary

Studies how deal-protection devices in M&A practice changed from 2003 to 2015, including termination fees, match rights, asset lockups, and side agreements with deal-protection effects. The article connects transactional practice to Delaware doctrine, game theory, and judicial review of provisions that deter competing bids.

Citation

Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian. "The New Look of Deal Protection." Stanford Law Review, 2017.

BibTeX

@article{Restrepo2017The,
  title = {The New Look of Deal Protection},
  author = {Fernan Restrepo and Guhan Subramanian},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {Stanford Law Review},
  url = {https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/04/69-Stan-L-Rev-1013.pdf}
}
Original source: Stanford Law Review

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