Foundations of Law and Economics
Introductory
Game Theory
A framework for analyzing situations in which each actor's best choice depends on the anticipated choices of others.
Why It Matters
Game theory clarifies bargaining, litigation strategy, corporate voting, repeated dealings, regulatory compliance, and coordination problems created by legal rules.
Selected Literature
A short list of directly relevant archive entries.
1979
Advanced
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Oliver E. Williamson
Journal of Law and Economics
2016
Advanced
2019
Advanced
Related Cases
1707
Foundations of Law and Economics
Keeble v. Hickeringill
11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707)
Property protection, malicious interference, and incentives to make productive use of land.
1805
Foundations of Law and Economics
Pierson v. Post
3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
First possession, capture rules, and the administrability of property rights in wild animals.
1854
Foundations of Law and Economics
Hadley v. Baxendale
9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)
Foreseeability, information disclosure, and limits on consequential damages for breach of contract.
1879
Foundations of Law and Economics
Sturges v. Bridgman
11 Ch. D. 852 (1879)
Nuisance, coming to the nuisance, and reciprocal conflicts over incompatible land uses.