Securities Regulation
Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems
Paul G. Mahoney
- Year
- 1995
- Venue
- University of Chicago Law Review
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Reframes mandatory disclosure as a response to agency problems between managers and investors rather than only as a cure for market-wide information failure. The article is useful for comparing disclosure mandates with private contracting and governance mechanisms.
Citation
Paul G. Mahoney. "Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems." University of Chicago Law Review, 1995.
BibTeX
@article{Mahoney1995Mandatory,
title = {Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems},
author = {Paul G. Mahoney},
year = {1995},
journal = {University of Chicago Law Review},
url = {https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol62/iss3/3/}
}