Financial Law and Risk Control
Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?
Martin F. Hellwig
- Year
- 2010
- Venue
- ifo DICE Report
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Evaluates objections to materially higher bank-equity requirements after the crisis. The paper distinguishes private funding costs from social costs and explains why leverage incentives and implicit guarantees weaken arguments for preserving pre-crisis capital structures.
Citation
Martin F. Hellwig. "Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?." ifo DICE Report, 2010.
BibTeX
@article{Hellwig2010Capital,
title = {Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?},
author = {Martin F. Hellwig},
year = {2010},
journal = {ifo DICE Report},
url = {https://ideas.repec.org/p/mpg/wpaper/2010_31.html}
}