
Spier
Kathryn E. Spier
Economist of litigation, settlement, liability, and strategic contracting
Official Source Note
Harvard Law School lists Spier as Domenico De Sole Professor of Law and describes her research and teaching at the intersection of law, economics, and business strategy. Her work uses economic models to study litigation, settlement, contracts, liability, and legal procedure.
Spier is included because her sequential-bargaining models explain deadline effects, delay, and trial selection and make the litigation process itself an object of economic and institutional analysis.
Source: Harvard Law School
Relevance to the Archive
Spier connects civil procedure to bargaining under incomplete information and helps researchers distinguish filed cases, settled disputes, and adjudicated outcomes.
Representative Contributions
- The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation (1992)
- Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules (1994)
- The Economics of Litigation (2007)
Works Included Here
1992
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