Stiglitz
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Economist of asymmetric information, market failure, and public policy
Official Source Note
Nobel Prize materials identify Stiglitz as a 2001 economics laureate for analysis of markets with asymmetric information and emphasize his work on screening, self-selection, and the behavior of imperfectly informed market participants.
Stiglitz is included because information asymmetry is a central mechanism in securities disclosure, credit rationing, insurance regulation, consumer protection, and institutional responses to market failure.
Source: Nobel Prize
Relevance to the Archive
Stiglitz provides a general foundation for disclosure, insurance, credit, consumer protection, and regulatory analysis whenever information is unevenly distributed and market responses are endogenous.
Representative Contributions
- Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets (with Michael Rothschild, 1976)
- On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets (with Sanford Grossman, 1980)
- Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (with Andrew Weiss, 1981)
Works Included Here
1980
Introductory
On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets
Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz
American Economic Review