Financial Law and Risk Control

The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements

Charles W. Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn

Year
1991
Venue
American Economic Review
Level
Advanced
American Economic Review cover
Archive-designed coverAmerican Economic Review

Summary

Explains demandable debt as a governance mechanism that can discipline banks and constrain managers. The article is useful for understanding why fragile funding structures may also perform monitoring and incentive functions.

Citation

Charles W. Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements." American Economic Review, 1991.

BibTeX

@article{Calomiris1991The,
  title = {The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements},
  author = {Charles W. Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn},
  year = {1991},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/2006865}
}
Original source: JSTOR

Related Concepts