Corporate Law and Corporate Governance
The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy
Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian
- Year
- 2002
- Venue
- Stanford Law Review
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Shows how effective staggered boards can sharply reduce the success of hostile bids by forcing bidders to win multiple elections over time. The article combines theory and evidence from hostile bids to evaluate staggered boards, poison pills, shareholder choice, and the costs of antitakeover protection.
Citation
Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian. "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy." Stanford Law Review, 2002.
BibTeX
@article{Bebchuk2002The,
title = {The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy},
author = {Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, and Guhan Subramanian},
year = {2002},
journal = {Stanford Law Review},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=304388}
}