Foundations of Law and Economics
The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
George A. Akerlof
- Year
- 1970
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Shows how asymmetric information about quality can drive valuable transactions from a market. The model is central to legal analysis of disclosure, warranties, certification, gatekeeping, and other institutions that make credible information available.
Citation
George A. Akerlof. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970.
BibTeX
@article{Akerlof1970The,
title = {The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism},
author = {George A. Akerlof},
year = {1970},
journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/1879431}
}