Corporate Law and Corporate Governance
The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
Lucian A. Bebchuk
- Year
- 2002
- Venue
- University of Chicago Law Review
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Argues that target boards should not retain veto power over takeover bids once shareholders can make an undistorted choice. The article evaluates board-veto arguments based on director information, bargaining, long-term value, stakeholder protection, and shareholder wealth, then connects the analysis to judicial review of defensive tactics.
Citation
Lucian A. Bebchuk. "The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers." University of Chicago Law Review, 2002.
BibTeX
@article{Bebchuk2002The,
title = {The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers},
author = {Lucian A. Bebchuk},
year = {2002},
journal = {University of Chicago Law Review},
url = {https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol69/iss3/10/}
}