Corporate Law and Corporate Governance
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
Henry G. Manne
- Year
- 1965
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Level
- Intermediate
Summary
Develops the market for corporate control as an external governance mechanism. The article argues that takeover threats can discipline inefficient management, links share prices to managerial performance, and frames mergers as a mechanism for reallocating control over corporate assets.
Citation
Henry G. Manne. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control." Journal of Political Economy, 1965.
BibTeX
@article{Manne1965Mergers,
title = {Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control},
author = {Henry G. Manne},
year = {1965},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/1829523}
}