Corporate Law and Corporate Governance
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan
- Year
- 2001
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Tests whether executive compensation responds to observable shocks outside a chief executive's control. The paper reports that pay responds to luck and that this relationship is weaker where governance is stronger, contributing evidence to debates between optimal contracting and managerial influence.
Citation
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan. "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001.
DOI: 10.1162/00335530152466269
BibTeX
@article{Bertrand2001Are,
title = {Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are},
author = {Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan},
year = {2001},
journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
doi = {10.1162/00335530152466269},
url = {https://hdl.handle.net/10.1162/00335530152466269}
}