Corporate Law and Corporate Governance

Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

Eugene F. Fama

Year
1980
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Level
Advanced
Journal of Political Economy cover
Archive-designed coverJournal of Political Economy

Summary

Recasts the firm as a nexus of contracts in which ownership of the firm is not necessary for control of productive activity. The article explains how labor, capital, managerial services, and risk bearing can be separated, and how managerial discipline can arise through managerial labor markets and capital markets.

Citation

Eugene F. Fama. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm." Journal of Political Economy, 1980.

BibTeX

@article{Fama1980Agency,
  title = {Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm},
  author = {Eugene F. Fama},
  year = {1980},
  journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
  url = {https://www.jstor.org/stable/1837292}
}
Original source: JSTOR

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