Corporate Law and Corporate Governance
A Theory of Friendly Boards
Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira
- Year
- 2007
- Venue
- Journal of Finance
- Level
- Advanced
Summary
Models the board's dual role as monitor and adviser when management controls access to firm-specific information. The article explains why board independence can improve monitoring yet weaken communication and advice.
Citation
Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira. "A Theory of Friendly Boards." Journal of Finance, 2007.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x
BibTeX
@article{Adams2007A,
title = {A Theory of Friendly Boards},
author = {Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira},
year = {2007},
journal = {Journal of Finance},
doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x}
}