Law & Economics

Foundations of Law and Economics

Introductory

Prisoners' Dilemma

A strategic setting in which individually rational choices can produce a collectively inferior result.

Why It Matters

The concept explains why legal rules, contracts, firms, sanctions, and repeated interaction may be needed to sustain cooperation when private incentives point toward defection.

Selected Literature

A short list of directly relevant archive entries.

Related Cases

1707

Foundations of Law and Economics

Keeble v. Hickeringill

11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707)

Property protection, malicious interference, and incentives to make productive use of land.

1805

Foundations of Law and Economics

Pierson v. Post

3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)

First possession, capture rules, and the administrability of property rights in wild animals.

1854

Foundations of Law and Economics

Hadley v. Baxendale

9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)

Foreseeability, information disclosure, and limits on consequential damages for breach of contract.

1879

Foundations of Law and Economics

Sturges v. Bridgman

11 Ch. D. 852 (1879)

Nuisance, coming to the nuisance, and reciprocal conflicts over incompatible land uses.