Property and Legal Institutions
Intermediate
Normative Hobbes Theorem
A normative proposition that law should allocate rights to minimize harm from failed bargaining when private agreement is too costly or unreliable.
Why It Matters
It complements Coasean bargaining by asking when courts, statutes, or regulators should allocate rights directly because bargaining will not solve the conflict.
Selected Literature
A short list of directly relevant archive entries.
1960
Introductory
1991
Advanced
2016
Advanced
2019
Advanced
Related Cases
1707
Foundations of Law and Economics
Keeble v. Hickeringill
11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707)
Property protection, malicious interference, and incentives to make productive use of land.
1805
Foundations of Law and Economics
Pierson v. Post
3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
First possession, capture rules, and the administrability of property rights in wild animals.
1879
Foundations of Law and Economics
Sturges v. Bridgman
11 Ch. D. 852 (1879)
Nuisance, coming to the nuisance, and reciprocal conflicts over incompatible land uses.