Welfare Analysis
Intermediate
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
A criterion under which a legal or policy change is efficient if the gains to winners are large enough that they could hypothetically compensate losers, even if compensation is not actually paid.
Why It Matters
The criterion is often used in economic analysis of law, but it also makes distributional and normative limits visible because potential compensation does not itself settle questions of fairness or legitimacy.
Selected Literature
A short list of directly relevant archive entries.
1973
Advanced
2001
Advanced
2004
Advanced
2016
Advanced
Related Cases
1943
Securities Regulation
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.
320 U.S. 344 (1943)
Whether sales of oil-lease assignments promoted together with a promised test well were investment contracts subject to federal securities law.
2020
Securities Regulation
Liu v. SEC
591 U.S. 71 (2020)
When disgorgement in an SEC civil action qualifies as equitable relief authorized by federal securities law.