Foundations of Law and Economics
Introductory
Coase Theorem
A proposition associated with Coasean analysis: when transaction costs are zero and rights are clearly assigned, voluntary bargaining can lead to an efficient allocation regardless of the initial legal entitlement.
Why It Matters
The point is less that transaction costs are usually absent than that legal analysis should ask when bargaining is feasible, when it fails, and how legal rules affect the cost of reaching efficient arrangements.
Selected Literature
A short list of directly relevant archive entries.
1960
Introductory
1967
Intermediate
1972
Intermediate
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed
Harvard Law Review
2016
Advanced
Related Cases
1879
Foundations of Law and Economics
Sturges v. Bridgman
11 Ch. D. 852 (1879)
Nuisance, coming to the nuisance, and reciprocal conflicts over incompatible land uses.
1707
Foundations of Law and Economics
Keeble v. Hickeringill
11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1707)
Property protection, malicious interference, and incentives to make productive use of land.
1805
Foundations of Law and Economics
Pierson v. Post
3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)
First possession, capture rules, and the administrability of property rights in wild animals.
1854
Foundations of Law and Economics
Hadley v. Baxendale
9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)
Foreseeability, information disclosure, and limits on consequential damages for breach of contract.