Securities Regulation

1997

United States v. O'Hagan

521 U.S. 642 (1997)

Supreme Court of the United States

Issue

Misappropriation theory of insider trading and tender-offer fraud rules.

Facts

James O'Hagan, a partner at a law firm representing a bidder in a potential tender offer for Pillsbury, bought Pillsbury securities and options before the bid became public, even though he did no work on the representation.

Holding

The Court upheld insider-trading liability under the misappropriation theory and sustained SEC Rule 14e-3.

Reasoning

Justice Ginsburg reasoned that a trader commits deception when he misappropriates confidential information in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information and secretly uses it for securities trading. The fraud lies in feigning loyalty to the information source while converting the information for personal trading gain.

Why It Matters

O'Hagan is essential for studying information ownership, fiduciary duties, tender-offer regulation, and the deterrence of opportunistic trading.

Research Questions

  1. How does the rule affect information production, investor reliance, and enforcement costs?
  2. What are the likely error costs for lawful market activity and for undetected misconduct?

Case Text and Citation

Cite the reported decision as 521 U.S. 642 (1997). The linked copy is provided for reading access and may be hosted by a court, institutional repository, or secondary case archive.

Open case text: Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center